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break in the traditional preoccupation of the courts with the protec-
tion of the broker, and is a further step in a growing trend toward
protection of the consumer in his dealings with commercial specialists
whose services are required but not understood.
TERRY B. LIGHT
Constitutional Law-FREE SPEECH-PUBLIC TRANSIT ADVERTISING.
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.,1 an association
known as "Women for Peace" sought to buy bus advertising space
to place a message advocating a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam
War.2 Defendant transit company refused the request, stating that their
policy was to allow only commercial advertisements for the sale of
goods and services, except during elections.3 An action was brought
by the association alleging that defendants' refusal had deprived them
of their rights of free speech and equal protection under the First4 and
Fourteenth5 Amendments to the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals rejected the association's allegations, finding
that the defendants' advertising policy was neither arbitrary nor dis-
criminatory but rather in the public interest.' The California Supreme
Court, in reversing the lower court's decision, held that by allowing
commercial advertising, the transit district had opened their facilities
as a "forum for the expression of ideas," and therefore they could not
1. 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982 (1967).
2. The text of the proposed advertisement was:
"Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind."
President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam.
Women for Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley.
id., at 432, 434 P.2d at 984.
S. Id. Defendants were a public transit district and a private corporation. The
corporation leased advertising space from the district and re-leased it to advertisers
under an agreement where advertisements on controversial subjects were not accept-
able unless approved by the district.
4. U.S. Cosr. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press. .. "
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: ... nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 61 Cal. Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1967).
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"for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertise-
ments expressing opinions and beliefs within the ambit of First Amend-
ment protection." 7
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the freedoms of
speech, religion, and press as the fundamental rights and liberties at
the foundation of the democratic form of government." Even where
these rights are in conflict with the powers of the state, they have a
preferred position,9 except when there is a "clear and present danger"
to the public interest.'" Though commercial advertising is not within
the purview of the First Amendment," the word "commercial" has
been given a narrow meaning, and the fact that an advertisement has
been paid for does not in itself make it commercial in the context of
First Amendment protection. 2 Instead, there must be a showing that
the purpose of the enterprise was profit-inspired. 3 However, the free-
doms of press and speech have been extended to include every publi-
cation which constitutes a vehicle for information and opinion.' 4 Thus,
statutes restricting and regulating the commercial use of handbills, 3
7. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 433, 434 P.2d
982, 985 (1967).
8. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
9. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
115 (1943).
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The classic example used as a "clear
and present danger" is the scream of "fire" in a crowded movie theater. United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Courts must
weigh the "evil" to be curbed against the invasion of free speech.
11. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills,
93 N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (1966); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641, 1668 (1967). See also Developments in the
Law.-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HtAqv. L. Rav. 1005, 1027-1038 (1967).
12. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1964).
13. Long v. Anaheim, 63 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Ct. App. 1967); Bowling Green v. Lodico,
11 Ohio St.2d 135. 228 N.E.2d 325 (1967).
14. E.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (radio); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d
235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966) (television). But see Mid-West Elec. Co-
operative, Inc. v. Chamber of Commerce, 369 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). See
generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAnv. L.
REv. 1641 (1967).
15. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17
(7th Cir. 1966).
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billboards,' 6 loudspeakers,-1 and the sale of magazines", are constitu-
tional; but the same statutes are unconstitutional in their application
to messages of a political or religious nature.
This principle has also been extended to those statutes which grant
wide discretionary powers in the free speech area to governing bodies.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that although a governing
body is under no duty to open its facilities to the public, if it does, it
must grant the use of them in a nondiscriminatory, nondiscretionary
manner.'9 In Cox v. Louisiana,20 appellant had been charged with vio-
lating an obstruction of public passages statute while leading a demon-
stration protesting segregated lunch counters. The Supreme Court dis-
missed the action, finding that although the statute was valid on its face
because governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to
keep the city's streets open for the convenience and safe use of its citi-
zens, 2 it was unconstitutional as applied, in that it permitted public of-
ficials to use their unfettered discretion in authorizing parades and other
assembliesY2
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.23 is similar to Cox in
that the defendants had used their discretion to bar political views.
In finding for the association, the court took the view that by opening
its facilities to advertising, the transit district did not have the right to
favor one group over another,24 or commercial ideas over political
16. Compare State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825 (Hawaii 1967), and
Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St.2d 425, 200 N.E. 2d 328 (1964), switb
Peltz v. South Euclid, 11 Ohio St.2d 128, 228 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
17. In Chester Branch, NAACP v. Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa. 1966), an
ordinance governing sound trucks was found to be constitutional since (1) it was
based on clear nondiscretionary standards beyond the control of any local official,
and (2) it reflected the concern of a government for the peace and tranquility of its
community. However, a $25 fee for a permit to use sound equipment was uncon-
stitutional since it was an interference with the freedom of speech.
18. People v. Krebs, 54 Misc.2d 578, 282 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Crim. Ct. 1967); Bowling
Green v. Lodico, 11 Ohio St.2d 135, 228 N.E.2d 325 (1967).
19. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885
(1946); Madole v. Barnes, 20 N.Y.2d 169, 229 N.E.2d 20, 282 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967);
Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219 N.E.2d 172,
272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); cf. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
20. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
21. Id. at 553-558.
22. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Hammond v. State College, 272 F. Supp.
947 (S.C. 1967); cf. Hamer v. Musselwhite 376 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1967).
23. 64 Cal Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982 (1967).
24. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946);
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ones, 25 no matter how objectionable they might be to the district's cus-
tomers,26 unless there was a showing of a clear and present danger.2
Although the California Court has not changed any basic interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment's protected freedoms, it has extended
them to another public medium of communication. While the minority
felt that the district should not be compelled to subject itself and its
customers to controversial and objectionable ideas, 28 the majority fol-
lowed the prevailing view in the United States that a function of free
speech is to invite dispute, create dissatisfaction, and stir people to
anger.2o
The courts have opefied virtually all forms of public communica-
tions media to political and religious expression. By requiring an en-
tirely commercial but public transit district to accept political advertis-
ing, the courts may be setting a trend requiring private communica-
tions media to be forums for the free expression of beliefs and ideas.
JOEL H. SHANE
Constitutional Law-EQuAL PROTECTION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHIL-
DREN. In Levy v. Louisiana,1 a suit was brought on behalf of five il-
legitimate children for the wrongful death of their mother.2 The
Louisiana District Court dismissed the suit,3 finding that "child" un-
Community Concerts Ass'n v. Bd. of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219 N.E.2d 172,
272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966); Madole v. Barnes, 20 N.Y.2d 169, 229 NE.2d 20, 282
N.YS.2d 225 (1967).
25. Thomas v. Collins, 33 U.S. 516 (1945).
26. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
27. In Kissinger v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
a case very similar to Wirta, defendant transit authority contended that Vietnam peace
signs in subways would endanger the safety of its customers. The court held that
this raised a question of fact as to the "clear and present danger" of such signs,
and thus it was for a jury to decide. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal.2d 235, 411 P.2d 289,
49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
28. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 438, 434 P.2d
982, 990 (1967).
29. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
1. 192 So.2d 193 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
2. The children, who were raised by the mother, sued for: (1) damages to them
for loss of their mother; and (2) damages based on the survival of a cause of action
which the mother had at the time of her death for pain and suffering.
3. No. 430-566 (Civ. Dis. Ct. for the Parish of Orleans, 196-).
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